Abstract. Secret image sharing is a popular technology to secure digital images in storage and transmission. Traditionally, the technology transforms one secret image into several images called shadows or shares. Later, when the number of collected shadows reaches a specified threshold value, the decomposed image can be reconstructed. We propose a new sharing approach to transform n secret images into n shadows. Later, after gathering all the n shadows, all the n secret images can be retrieved error-free. No information in any secret image is revealed if one shadow is absent. The total size of n generated shadows is identical to the total size of n input secret images; hence, this approach does not waste storage space. Each pixel in each secret image is reconstructed using only one Boolean, one modulus, and two mathematical operations, so it is also a fast approach for reconstructing many secret images. Comparisons are included.
Introduction
To secure an image file in storage or transmission, there are two well-known sharing approaches: polynomial secret sharing ͑PSS͒ 1 and visual cryptography ͑VC͒. 2 They can divide a secret image into several extremely noisy images called shadows ͑also called shares͒. Each participant can hold some of these shadows. Later, when the total number of shadows brought to a meeting reaches a specified threshold value, the shared secret image can be reconstructed. Several extended works of the introducing papers 1,2 have been reported. Examples include the reduction of memory cost for shadows, 3 extension of binary VC to grayscale 4 or color images, 5 even a two-in-one sharing method called VCPSS 6 that combined PSS and VC to create a tool whose decoding quality depends on the condition of whether a computer is available or not.
In real life, a project team often processes several secret images simultaneously. Therefore, some research shared multiple images in one encoding process. For example, the elegant PSS scheme 7 presented by Feng et al. used Lagrange interpolation to deal with multisecret images. Their method is an economical method, for it has a very high input/output ͑I/O͒ size ratio between 1 / 2 and 1, i.e., total input image size is at least 50% of the total output shadow size, and 100% is possible. But the computational complexity O͑log 2 k͒ would be needed to reconstruct each secret pixel by using Lagrange interpolation from k required shadows. To the contrary, to save computational operations in the retrieval of secret images, visual cryptography ͑VC͒ schemes can be used. For example, Shyu et al. used two circular shadows to design a VC scheme 8 that can share more than two secret images. Feng et al. also presented a multisecret VC scheme, 9 and their shadows are in rectangular shape. By stacking the shadows ͑know as transparencies in the VC field͒, these VC schemes are very fast in revealing all secret images. The disadvantage of using VC methods is their low I/O size ratio ͑at least 1 / 2͒ due to the high pixel expansion rate ͑perм 2͒ in generating shadows. As for the disadvantage of the low contrast of the images recovered by stacking transparencies, it can be avoided if VC methods are implemented on a computer. When VC methods are implemented on a computer to reconstruct n original secret images error-free, the complexity to decode a pixel of a secret image would be O͑n͒ due to the high per.
Besides PSS and VC schemes, Alvarez, Encinas, and del Rey also developed a multisecret sharing scheme 10 for color images with different sizes based on modulus operations. Albeit their I/O size ratio is a very good value n / ͑n +1͒ after sharing n secret images by n + 1 shadows, their reconstruction in each secret pixel needs one modulus operation and many mathematical operations ͑addition or subtraction͒ whose computational complexity is O͑n͒. Muñoz-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Vera developed three very fast methods [11] [12] [13] based on phase encoding of a secret image and a pattern image. In their methods, decoding is performed by using just a simple overlapping operation to retrieve each pixel of the input secret image. The methods are very fast, but their decryption creates approximated versions of the original image, rather than error-free recovery. Among the error-free ͑lossless͒ schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] for multise-crets, no one can simultaneously own the two advantages: 1. I/O size ratio is 1, and 2. only a constant number of operations is needed to reconstruct each secret pixel. To achieve these two advantages simultaneously, we propose here a novel sharing scheme for multiple images, by using modulus ͑MOD͒ and exclusive-OR ͑XOR͒ operations. The proposed method generates n extremely noisy shadows for n given binary/grayscale/color secret images ͑notably, the n given images all have the same size͒, and each shadow's size is identical to each given image. When the n shadows replace the n original secret images in the image database, since our I/O size ratio is always 1, we do not need extra storage space. Furthermore, after gathering all n shadows, our lossless decoding process only uses one XOR, one MOD, one addition ͑ADD͒, and one subtraction ͑SUB͒ operation ͑symbolized as , Mod, ϩ, and Ϫ͒ to reconstruct each pixel's 8-bit value of each secret image. This holds for all values of n. Hence, no matter how many secret images are shared, the CPU time in decoding each secret image will not increase. In summary, the proposed lossless method is not only economical in storage space of shadows but also in constant-speed quickness in decoding. The rest of the work is as follows. Section 2 describes two basic tools based on MOD and XOR operations, respectively, and these tools are used in the proposed method. Section 3 presents the method. Section 4 gives experimental result and comparisons. Security analysis is in Sec. 5. Summary and future work are in Sec. 6.
Two Basic Tools Used in the Proposed
Scheme To achieve the two advantages ͑higher I/O size ratio and fewer decoding operations͒ mentioned in Sec. 1, two basic tools are used in the proposed method. The first is the "MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool" in Sec. 2.1, which can make our I/O size ratio 1. The other is the "XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool" in Sec. 2.2, which can make our ͑n , n͒ scheme only need constant operations to decode each secret pixel, no matter how large the value of n is.
MOD-Based (2, 2) Secret Sharing Tool
Thien and Lin proposed a modified version 14 of Shamir's ͑k , n͒-threshold PSS approach 1 to reduce the size of shadows. They use polynomials to share a secret image A among n shadows B 1 , B 2 , ... ,B n ; and each of them is k times smaller than A in size. A cannot be revealed unless k of the n shadows are gathered. In their encoding, to transform a sector ͕a 0 , a 1 , ... ,a k−1 ͖ formed of k secret pixel values of A into n shadow pixel values ͕b 1 , b 2 , ... ,b n ͖, ͑where each b i B i ͒, they use a prime number p = 251 to create a polynomial,
of degree k − 1. Then we evaluate b 1 = q͑1͒ , b 2 = q͑2͒ ,¯, b n = q͑n͒. Later, using any k of the n produced pairs ͕͑i , b i ͖͒ i=1 n , people can recover all k coefficients a 0 , a 1 , ... ,a k−1 in q͑x͒ by constructing the interpolation polynomial.
To let our method have shadows with small size, we apply Ref. 14. More specifically, we apply Ref. 14 in a special manner ͑k =2, n =2͒. We call this ͑2, 2͒ scheme a "MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool." The tool is described as follows. Step 1. Use a prime number key to generate a permutation sequence to permute all pixel positions of the given grayscale image A. Then attach the key in the permuted image Ã .
Step 2. Sequentially read in gray values ͕p i ͖ of Ã , and then store in array E according to the rules.
Step 2.1. If p i Ͻ 250, then store p i in E.
Step 2.2. If p i м 250, then split p i into two values 250 and ͑p i − 250͒. Store these two values in E ͑first 250, then p i − 250͒.
Step 3. Sequentially grab two not-shared-yet elements a 0 and a 1 of E. Use the grabbed ͑a 0 , a 1 ͒ to evaluate
and then attach b 1 to shadow B 1 , and attach b 2 to shadow B 2 .
Step 4. Repeat step 3 until all elements of the array E are processed. Step 2. Use these two values ͑b 1 , b 2 ͒ to recover the two coefficients ͑a 0 , a 1 ͒ in Eqs. ͑2͒ and ͑3͒ by
The recovered ͑a 0 , a 1 ͒ are the two corresponding values in E.
Step 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until all values of the two shadows B 1 and B 2 are processed.
Step 4. Sequentially grab an element p i of E, then do:
Step 4. Step 5. Extract the prime number key from Ã and apply the inverse-permutation operation to the permuted image Ã to get back to the secret image A.
In this reveal algorithm, only three operations ͑one SUB, one ADD, and one MOD͒ are needed in Eqs. ͑4͒ or ͑5͒ to reconstruct each secret pixel of Ã . Because usually there are only a few pixels in A ͑and hence in Ã ͒ whose gray values are above 250, the ADD operation in step 4.2 seldom occurs. Also, for each pixel, step 5 uses one mapping operation ͑indexing͒ rather than computational operation.
Exclusive-OR-Based ͑n , n͒ Shadows
Combination Tool Once all given n secret images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n are processed by the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool described in Sec. 2.1, each secret image A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒ generates two half-size temporary shadows B i,1 and B i,2 . To avoid any secret leaking when collecting less than n final shadows, we use the following steps of a combination phase to form the final shadow C i . Step 1. Size-synchronization: if some shadows B i,j ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n and 1 ഛ j ഛ 2͒ have distinct size due to the existence of pixels whose gray values are in 251 to 255 in some images A i , then add a suitable number of dummy pixels in all shadows to make all shadows B i,j have the same size as the one with the largest size.
Step 2. Stacking: take the first not-yet-processed pixel b i,1 from each shadow B i,1 ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒. Then evaluate the corresponding pixel b * for a new image B * by
After all pixels of all B i,1 are processed, the generation of image B * is done, and its size is the same as 
After all pixels in all B i,2 are processed, all n images B i, 3 are generated. Notably, each B i,3 is as large as each B i,2 .
Step 4 When all n final shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n are gathered, we can reconstruct all B i,1 and B i,2 ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒ by using the following steps of a decomposing phase whose computation is very low. 
After all pixels of all B i,3 are processed, all B i,2 are recovered.
On average, only one XOR operation is needed to recover a pixel of a secret image, and this statement is true for each secret image A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒. The analysis is as fol- lows. Assume size of each A i is w ϫ h, then each B i,1 in step 2 uses on average ͓͑n −1͒ / n͔ ϫ ͓͑w ϫ h͒ / 2͔ XOR operations in Eq. ͑6͒ to create B * . And each B i,3 in step 3 uses on average ͑w ϫ h͒ / 2 XOR operations in Eq. ͑8͒ to recover B i,2 . Therefore, for each secret image A i , the total number of XOR operations needed in the decomposition phase is ͕͓͑n −1͒ / n͔ +1͖ ϫ ͓͑w ϫ h͒ / 2͔, which will be smaller than 1 after dividing by A i 's size w ϫ h. In other words, less than one XOR operation is needed in the decomposition phase to recover a pixel of a secret image A i .
Proposed Method 3.1 Encoding
The encoding uses the sharing phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1, followed by the combination phase of the XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool in Sec. 2.2. The encoding creates n shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n to replace the n given secret images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n . The main steps are as follows.
Encoding algorithm. ͑The diagram is in Fig. 1 .͒ Input: n input binary/grayscale/color secret images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n of the same size.
Step 1. It does not matter whether the image is binary or gray or color, just treat each A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒ as a long byte-stream ͑so each element has 8 bits and can be considered as a gray-value pixel͒.
Step 2. Then, for each stream A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒, use the sharing phase of MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1 to create its half-size shadows ͕B i,1 , B i,2 ͖.
Step 3. Use all ͕B i,1 , B i,2 ͖ 1 ഛ i ഛ n in the combination phase of the XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool in Sec. 2.2 to generate n final shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n .
Notably, each final shadow C i is ͑nearly͒ as large as A i . As a result, even from a multisecrets view, the I/O size ratio is also 1, because total secret size ͉͕A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n ͖͉ is identical to the total shadow size ͉͕C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n ͖͉.
Decoding
To recover the n secret images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n from the n final shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n , the decoding uses the decomposition phase of the XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool in Sec. 2.2, followed by the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1. The main steps are as follows.
Decoding algorithm. ͑See the diagram in Fig. 2 .͒
Step 1. Use the decomposition phase of the XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool in Sec. 2.2 to reconstruct the half-size images ͕B i,1 ; B i,2 ͖1 ഛ i ഛ n from the n final shadows ͕C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n ͖.
Step 2. For each pair ͕B i,1 ; B i,2 ͖, where 1 ഛ i ഛ n, use the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1 to recover the secret image A i from ͕B i,1 ; B i,2 ͖.
Step 3. If the original secret images are not gray-valued, then transform all n 8-bit images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n to their binary/color equivalent.
On average, the decoding only needs one XOR, one MOD, one ADD, and one SUB operations ͑all are between bytes͒ to reconstruct each 1-byte ͑8-bit͒ pixel value of a secret image. ͑In step 1 of decoding, one XOR operation is needed to recover a 1-byte pixel value of B i,2 for the decomposition phase of the XOR-based ͑n , n͒ shadows combination tool. In step 2, one MOD, one ADD, and one SUB operations are needed to recover a 1-byte pixel value of A i in the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool.͒
Experimental Result and Comparisons 4.1 Experimental Result
In the experiment here, without the loss of generality, let n = 5 and let the n input images ͕A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A 5 ͖ be the 512ϫ 512 grayscale images ͕Jet, Lena, Pepper, Scene, and Monkey͖ shown in Figs. 3͑a͒-3͑e͒. Then, Figs. 4͑a͒-4͑e͒ show the n = 5 final shadows ͕C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C 5 ͖ generated in Sec. 3.1, and each 512ϫ 512 shadow is as large as each input image. Figures 5͑a͒-5͑e͒ show five error-free recovered images A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A 5 ͑Jet, Lena, Pepper, Scene, and Monkey͒ in Sec. 3.2 using all n = 5 final shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C 5 . In general, all recovered images in our method are error-free, i.e., the peak signal-to-noise ratio ͑PSNR͒ value is infinity ͑ϱ͒ for each of our recovered images. So each of the recovered images ͕Jet, Lena, Peppers, Scene, and Monkey͖ shown in Fig. 5 has PSNR= ϱ. ͑The five images in Fig. 5 and the five images in Fig. 3 are exactly the same, rather than just similar.͒ In addition, to show our constant decoding-time property in the retrieval, we also listed in Table 1 the number of operations on average needed to decode each one of the n secret images. It can be seen that, indeed, a constant number of operations is needed for each value of n. The actual CPU time taken in decoding is also checked in a computer. We still find that our decoding time does not vary as the value of n varies. Table 2 compares our method with other multisecret schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] in terms of two quantifiable measures: 1. I/O size ratio and 2. decoding computational complexity. For comparison, the same conditions hold for each scheme. They are: 1. there are n secret images, 2. every recovered image must be lossless, and 3. the computer versions of VC schemes 8, 9 are implemented using an OR-like operation to simulate the stacking action of transparencies. From Table  2 , we can see that our method not only keeps the I/O size ratio as large as 1, but also needs only constant decoding operations to reconstruct a secret pixel. Other schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] either have I/O size ratio smaller than 1, or need nonconstant decoding complexity to reconstruct a secret pixel. For completeness, we also include in Table 2 the very fast methods [11] [12] [13] developed by Muñoz-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-Vera that use one secret image and one pattern image as input. Their I/O size ratios are as good as ours. Their decoding complexity is very economic, but their decoding only gives approximated versions ͑rather than errorfree recovery͒ of the original image. So theirs and ours have different highlighting. 
Comparisons

Fig. 5
The five error-free images ͑PSNR= ϱ͒ recovered by using all five shadows ͑Fig. 4͒ in the n = 5 case. 
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the encrypted images ͑shadows͒.
Probability
Assume that only n − 1 final shadows are available, and a shadow C j is missing. Then, people cannot obtain B * created by b * = b 1,1 b 2,1 ¯ b n,1 in Eq. ͑6͒, due to the lack of the b j,1 , which is in the front half of C j . Wthout B * , people cannot reconstruct B 1,2 , B 2,2 , ... ,B n,2 defined by b i,2 = b i,3 b * ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒ in Eq. ͑8͒. As a result, no secret image A i can be recovered ͓see the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1͔ due to absence of all B i,2 ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒.
Next we discuss the probability of obtaining some right secret images A i through guessing. Without the loss of generality, assume that a betrayal party of n − 1 participants gathers their n − 1 final shadows C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C n−1 , and try to recover some of the n secret images without the cooperation of the missing shadow C n . From Eqs. ͑6͒ and ͑8͒, we have
Because of the lack of C n = ͓B n,1 ; B n,3 ͔, for each pixel b n,1 in B n,1 , the betrayal party will have to guess a value, and then they use this guessing value to get a set of n − 1 pixel values b 1,2 , b 2,2 , ... ,b n−1,2 in B 1,2 , B 2,2 , ... ,B n−1,2 , respectively, at the same pixel position ͑there is no b n,2 value in B n,2 due to lack of b n,3 ͒. Then, the 2 ϫ ͑n −1͒ secret pixels in A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A n−1 can be reconstructed by using b i,1 and b i,2 ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n −1͒ in the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1. This is just to reconstruct two pixels in each A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n −1͒. This value guessing of one pixel, like b n,1 , will repeat ͑w ϫ h͒ / 2 times if the size of each A i is w ϫ h ͑then, the size of B n,1 is 0.5ϫ w ϫ h͒. From this description, we can evaluate the probability of obtaining some right grayscale images A i of size w ϫ h as follows:
, which is ͑1 / 251͒ 512ϫ512/2 = ͑1 / 251͒ 131,072 =10 −314530 if each image size is 512ϫ 512. Here, 1 / values range= 1 / 251 is the probability to guess successfully a pixel's value whose range is from 0 to 250; w ϫ h / 2 is the number of pixels in B n,1 . In fact, for each secret image A i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n͒ in the encoding process ͓as we did in step 1 of the sharing phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1͔, we already use a prime number as a key ͑a seed͒ of a random number generator to rearrange all the pixel positions of A i . Even if many pixel values in B n,1 are guessed successfully, in step 4 of the reveal phase of the MOD-based ͑2, 2͒ secret sharing tool in Sec. 2.1, the recovered images Ã i ͑1 ഛ i ഛ n −1͒ are still extremely noisy. Therefore, the security guardian has double levels.
For instance, in the experimental example of Sec. 4.1, if we only get four shadows, say C 1 , C 2 , ... ,C 4 in Figs. 4͑a͒-4͑d͒, and then guess the pixel values of images B 5,1 Table 3 The entropy and PSNR values of the five generated noisy shadows ͕C 1 , C 2 , . . . ,C 5 ͖ shown in Fig. 4 . and B 5,2 , then the five recovered images of A 1 , A 2 , ... ,A 5 are the extremely noisy images shown in Fig. 6 .
Dissimilarity between Shadow Images
In the case of sensitivity, the difference between two shadow images cannot be observed visually. For this matter, we check the dissimilarity between shadow images as follows. First, from Table 3 , we can see that all generated shadows have very similar entropy ͑7.999͒ and very similar PSNRs ͑when they are all compared with a secret image, say Lena͒. Second, besides comparing a shadow ͑C i ͒ with a secret image, if a shadow C i is compared with another shadow C i ͑1 ഛ i Ͻ j ഛ 5͒, then a PSNR value called PSNR͑C i , C j ͒ can be evaluated by the formula PSNR͑C i ,C j ͒ = 10 ϫ log 10 255
and the computation result is as listed in Table 4 . From this table, we can see that the PSNR͑C i , C j ͒ values are all very low ͑smaller than 9͒ for all pairs of shadows ͑C i , C j ͒. This means that none of the shadows are alike. Third, none of the shadow C i in ͕C 1 , ... ,C 5 ͖ can be predicted in any part from another shadow C i , because each difference image ͉C i − C i ͉ ͑see Fig. 7͒ between two shadows C i and C j ͑1 ഛ i Ͻ j ഛ 5͒ still looks extremely noisy and has neither a meaningful pattern nor meaningful contour. From the end of Fig. 7 , we also see that the ten histograms for ͉C i − C j ͉ 1ഛiϽjഛ5 all look alike ͑due to space limitation, only two of the ten are shown͒, and this fact implies that the ten entropies for the ten difference images ͕͉C i − C j ͉͖ 1ഛiϽjഛ5 are almost identical ͑the entropy of each difference image reads 7.673…, as shown in Table 4 .͒ From Fig. 7 and Table 4 , no shadow can be predicted in any part from another shadow. Table 4 The entropy of the difference image ͉C i − C j ͉, and the PSNR͑C i , C j ͒ value. ͑The two shadow images C i and C j are taken from the five shadow images ͕C 1 , . . . ,C 5 ͖ shown in Fig. 4 . So there are 5! ÷ ͓2!͑5−2͒!͔ = 10 pairs.͒ Difference image
Statistical Analysis
Many attackers use statistical analysis to analyze the encrypted images to trace back the original secret images. So we also apply statistical analysis to our shadows. It includes the following: the histogram of each shadow is inspected in Sec. 5.3.1; the correlations of two adjacent pixels of each shadow are examined in Sec. 5.3.2; and the number of pixels change rate ͑NPCR͒ and unified average changing intensity ͑UACI͒ values are examined in Sec. 5.3.3 to check the relationship between the original images ͑secrets͒ and the encrypted images ͑shadows͒.
Histograms, entropies, and peak signal-to-
noise ratios of the encrypted images We still inspect the five images in Fig. 3 whose image contents are of quite different styles ͑airplane, human face, vegetable, scenery, and animal͒. The histograms of the five input images and the histograms of the five created shadows are compared. A typical example of the comparison is shown in Fig. 8 . The histogram of each encrypted image ͑shadow͒ is fairly uniform, and it is significantly different from the histogram of any input secret image ͑e.g., Lena͒. The same observation also exists for the shadows created using other sets of n secret images.
In general, besides the histogram, entropy is another useful value to measure the information distribution of an image. If an image has G gray levels ͑G ഛ 256͒, and the probability of gray-level k͑0 ഛ k ഛ G −1͒ is P͑k͒, then the image's entropy H e is
The entropy value of the secret image Lena in Fig. 8͑a͒ is H e ͑Lena͒ = 7.327, and the entropy value of the shadow image in Fig. 8͑c͒ In terms of PSNR, we include in Table 3 the PSNR values of the five generated shadow images printed in Fig.  4 . As shown in Table 3 , if we randomly pick a shadow C i ͑i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, because n =5͒ in Fig. 4 , and compare this randomly chosen shadow with the secret image Jet in Fig.  3 , then the PSNR value is in a very concentrated range ͑between 8.036 and 8.059, as shown in row 3 of Table 3͒ . Likewise, if we compare the randomly chosen shadow with the secret image Lena, then the PSNR value is still in a very concentrated range ͑between 9.473 and 9.514, as shown in row 4 of Table 3͒ . Similar observation exists in the remaining rows of Table 3 , if the secret image is being compared with Peppers ͑or Scene or Monkey͒. The phenomenon that shadows ͕C 1 , ... ,C 5 ͖ are so alike in both entropy and PSNRs indicates that the shadows are very similar in pixel distribution. Also note that the PSNR values appeared in Table 3 are all very low ͑less than 10͒, and this indicates that each of these extremely noisy shadows ͕C 1 , ... ,C 5 ͖ in Fig. 4 looks completely different from any of the five original secret images shown in Fig. 3 . Thus, the hackers can hardly guess what the original secret images are.
Correlation of two adjacent pixels
In the subsection, we examine the correlation between two ͑vertically/horizontally/diagonally͒ adjacent pixels. As quoted from Ref. 15 , for a given image, its correlation coefficient between adjacent pixels is computed according to the formula r xy = cov͑x,y͒
Here, the symbol ͑x , y͒ represents the random variable of the gray values of two adjacent pixels. Notably, for an image, if there are N pairs of ͑x , y͒, then we compute ͑14͒   Fig. 8 Histograms of the original and encrypted images. ͑a͒ is one of the n = 5 input secret images; ͑b͒ is the histogram of ͑a͒; ͑c͒ is a typical shadow image; and ͑d͒ is the histogram of ͑c͒.
to get r xy . Figure 9͑a͒ shows the distribution of two adjacent pixels ͑x , y͒ for the secret image Lena in Fig. 8͑a͒ . Then, Fig. 9͑b͒ shows the distribution for the shadow image sketched in Fig. 8͑c͒ . The correlation coefficients are 0.360456 and 0.004678, respectively. In general, the correlation coefficient is high for each secret image, and very low for each shadow.
Differential analysis
Here, the number of pixels change rate ͑NPCR͒ and unified average changing intensity ͑UACI͒ are checked. In general, when a pixel value is changed in one of the n secret images, two measures NPCR and UACI can be utilized to describe the impact to the n shadow images. Details are as follows.
Assume that we change a pixel value in one of the n input secret images-for example, change a pixel value for the Lena image shown in Fig. 3͑b͒ . Before this one-pixel change, let the n corresponding shadow images be ͕C 1 , ... ,C n ͖. Then, after this one-pixel change of the secret image Lena, let the n generated shadow images be ͕C 1 Ј, ... ,C n Ј͖. For the two versions C k and C k Ј of the k'th shadow, let C k ͑i , j͒ and C k Ј͑i , j͒ denote their grayscale values at position ͑i , j͒, respectively. The NPCR k for shadow k is defined as
where W and H are the width and height of a shadow. In the evaluation of NPCR k for shadow k, the comparison record D k is defined as the binary matrix in which D k ͑i , j͒ =0 if
bly, NPCR k measures the percentage of the altered pixels for shadow k ͑0% means the two versions C k and C k Ј of shadow k are identical everywhere͒. The UACI k for shadow k is defined as
which measures the average intensity of the differences between the two versions ͑C k and C k Ј͒ of shadow k.
One of the performed tests is when the one-pixel change is on the Lena image of Fig. 3͑b͒ . Then the range of ͕NPCR 1 , . . . , NPCR n ͖ for the n shadows is from 99.60 to 99.63%, and the range of ͕UACI 1 , . . . , UACI n ͖ for n shadows is from 33.20 to 33.40%. The average of ͕NPCR 1 , . . . , NPCR n ͖ is NPCR average = 99.6111%, and the average of ͕UACI 1 , . . . , UACI n ͖ is UACI average = 32.2980%. When the one-pixel change is on any other image of Fig. 3 , the average value of ͕NPCR 1 , . . . , NPCR n ͖ is still larger than 99.6%; and the average value of ͕UACI 1 , . . . , UACI n ͖ is still larger than 33.2%. Therefore, a one-pixel change in any secret image can cause a significant change to all n shadow images. Hence, our shadows can resist differential attack in which the opponents, as mentioned in Refs. 15 and 16, make a slight change in the secret image, and then observe the result in the shadow images. In this way, the opponents try to find a meaningful relationship between the pixels of the secret image and the pixels of the shadows. In our system, since one minor change in the secret image can cause a significant change in all shadows, the differential attack would become useless.
Summary and Future Works
A novel lossless sharing scheme for multiple secret images is designed using MOD and XOR operations. Our advantages are: 1. the total size of n given secret images is the same as the total size of the n final shadows ͑hence our I/O size ratio is 1͒; 2. we only need one XOR, one MOD, one ADD, and one SUB ͑all are byte-to-byte͒ operations to get a lossless recovery of each secret pixel's 8-bit value for the Fig. 9 Distribution of the pairs of adjacent pixels. ͑a͒ is for the secret image Lena sketched in Fig. 8͑a͒ , whereas ͑b͒ is for the shadow image sketched in Fig. 8͑c͒. given binary/grayscale/color images ͑so our decoding computational complexity for each pixel is a constant and independent of n͒.
Our method is better than other lossless multisecret schemes in terms of two quantity measures: I/O size ratio and decoding time. But Ref. 7-10 have features of their own. 1. Feng et al.'s 7 uses generalized access structures to achieve higher flexibility, and each qualified set of the access structure is able to share secret images independently. 2. If the shadows are printed in transparencies, then the VC schemes 8, 9 can also reveal images by doing physical stacking of transparencies although true-color images will be very hard for VC to retrieve error-free by stacking transparencies. 3. Alvarez et al.'s method 10 can process n given secret images of nonequal sizes. To improve our multisecret sharing scheme in the future, the advantages of these others will be our main guidelines.
